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ELEMENTS OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
by GEORGE N. LEIGHTON*
I.
INTRODUCTION

This article is for the practicing lawyer who on occasion
must determine whether a case qualifies for equitable relief.
Its purpose is to provide a guide to equitable remedies as they
have been affected by Illinois judicial reform and by recent
statutory and case law.
1.

An Historical Perspective
The system of equity jurisprudence which originated and
developed in England is the source of doctrines that govern the
administration of equitable remedies in the courts of Illinois.1
The history of the system is well written elsewhere. 2 To these
every practitioner should make reference. Practical considerations with which we are concerned require only a few words to
bring this history into perspective.
It has been said that equity, as a system of judicial concepts, was not originally created in the English courts of chancery.3 A comparable fusion of equitable doctrines is found in
a number of the world's systems of justice. 4 However, it was
only in England that a separate court, known as the Court
of Chancery, developed and evolved for administration of equitable doctrines.5 It was a separate court until the Judicature Act
of 1873 abolished the distinction between courts of chancery and
* George N. Leighton, Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; A.B., Howard University 1940; LL.B., Harvard Law School 1946;
Instructor in Criminal Law and Procedure, The John Marshall Law School.
Although the author accepts full responsibility for all parts of this
article, he wishes to acknowledge the assistance given him by the Editors
and Student Staff of The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure.
Messrs. Charles I. Freedenberg and David D. League prepared the'footnotes
to the text. Their devoted labors made the writing of this article easier,
and indeed possible. How well they performed the assignments given them,
can be seen from the quality of their work.
The author is deeply indebted to Miss Ruth L. Nelson and Miss Olga
Blonsky of the John Marshall office staff, who, under trying circumstances,
transcribed, typed and retyped the manuscript of this article.

1 Mahar v. O'Hara, 9 Ill. 356, 358-59, 4 Gilm. 424, 427 (1847) ; Chapman
v. Northern Trust Co., 219 Ill. App. 492, 496 --(1920), aff'd,-296 Ill; 353,
129 N.E. 836 (1921).
2 SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 5 n.13 (25th ed. R. Megarry & P. Baker
1960) states that: "The history of equity is dealt with in detail in Holdsworth's History of English Law and Kerly's History of Equity. Useful
summaries are contained in Ashburner's Principles of Equity, Maitland's
Lectures on Equity and Potter's Historical Introduction to English Law."
H. HANBURY,
4Id. at 4-5.
3

5Id. at 4.

MODERN EQUITY

4 & n.8 (7th ed. 1957).
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courts of law in England.6 Despite this abolition, equity as a
system of concepts and principles remains an influence in the
development of modern English and American law.
In this country, particularly in Illinois, equity was recognized as a separate system of jurisprudence administered by
judges sitting in chancery. 7 Although there never was a statutory court of chancery separate and distinct as a tribunal, it
was generally recognized that there always existed in Illinois
two tribunals, chancery and law, presided over by the same
judge, yet possessing separate and distinct jurisdictions. 8 From
1819 to 1933, when the Illinois Civil Practice Act was adopted,
the two systems existed side by side and were treated as separate
and distinct. It was in this way that the concepts of equity,
the bases of equitable jurisdiction, and the principles of equitable
relief evolved and developed as the system of equity we now
know in Illinois law. This evolution was consistent with the
American experience of a court of chancery administering a
system peculiar to equitable jurisdiction and existing within a
framework which provided a mode of justice similar to that
administered in England.
For the-Illinois practitioner, recent judicial reform has particular significance. Section 12 of article 6 of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 provided that "The circuit courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all causes in law and equity. .. ."
This constitutional provision solidified the concept of separate
tribunals for equity and law. As a corollary, jurisdiction of
Illinois courts in equity rested in part on statutes.10 This was
the situation until the civil procedure reforms of the 1930's.
Although lawyers generally believe that the Civil Practice Act
of 1933 merged law and equity, the Supreme Court in 1952 had
to remind the practicing bar that in Illinois the amalgamation
of law and equity was not complete."
In fact, this degree of amalgamation did not come until the
judicial article was amended by the electorate in November 1962,
effective January 1, 1964. The new judicial article provides
that:. "The Circuit Court shall have unlimited original jurisdictionof all justiciable matters ...
-12
This is a complete
merger-of-law and-equity. _Asa -result, jurisdictional distinctions
6 Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, §§24-25.
•7.Lullman v. Barrett, 18 Ill. App. 573, 575 (1886).
S Richards v. Hyde, 21 Ill. 788, 789, 21 Peck 640, 641 (1859); Ross v.
Buchanan, 13 Ill. 60, 63, 13 Peck 55, 58, (1851).
9 ILL. CONST. art. VI, §1-2 (18!70).
10 Jurisdiction vested in a court

of chancery remained there unless the
General Assembly by statutory enactment, acting within constitutional limits, abolished or limited its exercise. McNab v. Heald, 41 Ill. 326, 330
(1866); Latham v. McGinnis, 29 Ill. App. 152, 155 (1888).
11 Ellman v. DeRuiter, 412 Il. 285, 292, 106 N.E.2d 350, 353 (1952).
12 ILL, CONST. art. VI §9 (1870), as amended 1964.
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between courts of law and courts of equity no longer exist in
Illinois. Therefore, it is of no significance that a judicial district
or circuit court does not have a chancery division. In fact,
there are many circuit courts in the several Illinois judicial districts which do not have a separate division for equity cases.
For the practitioner, the important point is that under the
new judicial article every circuit court judge has equity powers.
This is in stark contrast with the judicial system that existed
prior to January 1, 1964 when Illinois had a multiplicity of
courts: municipal, city, and county; some, by statute, without the
13
power to grant equitable relief.

The injunction act, as it existed prior to 1964, is a good
example. From 1932 until 1965 only circuit courts, and the
superior court of Cook County, or a judge thereof, had the
power to grant an injunction. 14 Now, because of the constitutional change, the same section of the injunction statute simply
provides that: "The circuit courts shall have power to grant
writs of injunction.1'

15

It follows, therefore, that if a circuit

court judge sitting in a criminal case finds it necessary to issue
an injunction, he can do so. A magistrate sitting in a case
properly assigned to him can issue an injunction, reform a deed,
grant reformation or rescission of a contract, or order any form
of equitable relief which the cause requires, providing only, he
is presiding over "justiciable matters.' ' 16

It appears, then, that the effort at amalgamation which
began in England with the Judicature Act of 1873, brought into
effect in Illinois by the Civil Practice Act of 1933, reached the
conclusion visualized by reform advocates of the early 19th
Century when in 1964 Illinois amended its judicial article. However, it is a mistake to believe that both as to procedure and
substance there still does not exist some difference between
equity and law.
2.

A Definition
What is equity?
The term "equity" has both a broad and a narrow meaning.
In its broad sense, equity means natural justiceY.1 It means
13 Chancery Act, ILL.- REV. STAT. ch. 22, § 1 (1929), limited equity jurisdiction to "the several circuit courts and city courts of this state, and superior court of Cook county . ..
." Thus, magistrates, county and probate
courts did not have equitable powers.
14 "That the Superior court of Cook county, and the circuit courts [in
term time, and] or any judge thereof, when the court stands adjourned or is
in vacation shall have power to grant writs of injunction." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 69, § 1 (1933).
15ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, §1 (1965).
"6 ILL. CONST. art. VI, §9 (1870), as amended 1964.
17 SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3 (25th ed. R. Megarry & P. Baker
1960).
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doing right by another. In its narrow sense, equity is a body of
rules or principles that form an appendage to the general rules
of law."' In this sense, equity is the kind of relief granted in
courts of chancery. 19 It has been said by our Supreme Court
that: "Equity is the correction of that wherein the law, by
reason of its universality, is deficient. ' ' 20 Equity is based on
moral rights and natural justice.2
Contrary to a view held by
many, including judges, "Equity is not the chancellor's sense
of moral right, or his sense of what is just and equal. It is a
complex system of established law. ' 12 2 It is from these principles of moral justice and natural law that the doctrines of
equitable relief have evolved. They are unique to the system
of equitable jurisprudence and they are deserving of understanding by the lawyer who must decide when a case qualifies
for equitable relief.
3.

Requisites of Pleading

There was a time when equity pleadings in Illinois courts
differed from those filed in actions at law. These distinctions
were largely abolished by the Civil Practice Act of 1933.23 Section 31, as amended in 1955, provides that "there shall be
no distinctions respecting the manner of pleading between

actions at law and suits in equity .

...

"-4

Section 32, also

amended in 1955, provides that: "The first pleading by the plaintiff shall be designated a complaint. The first pleading by the
defendant shall be designated an answer."1 5 Yet, it is surprising
how often today one sees the first pleading of a plaintiff in
equity captioned "Bill in Equity."
With regard to pleadings, the equity practitioner should
examine Supreme Court Rule 13526 which governs pleading of
equitable matters. Subsection (a) provides that: "Matters
within the jurisdiction of a court of equity, whether directly or
as an incident to other matters before it, or which an equity
18 Id.
19

Id.

20 State Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Educ., 401 Ill.
252, 260, 81 N.E.2d
877, 21
881 (1948).
Jennings v. Kotz, 299 Ill. 465, 132 N.E. 625 (1921) ; Steger v. Traveling Men's Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 208 Ill. 236, 70 N.E. 236 (1904); Rayborn
v. Grand Lodge, 234 Il. App. 183 (1924).
22 Perry v. State, 6 Ill. Ct. Cl. 81, 84 (1928).
23 "[A]nd there shall be no distinctions respecting the manner of pleading between such actions at law and suits in equity, other than those specified
in this Act and the rules adopted pursuant thereto. .. ." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, §155 (1933). See Dunham v. Kauffman, 385 Ill. 79, 52 N.E.2d
143 (1943) ; Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 34 N.E.2d 424 (1941) ; Hawley
Products Co. v. May, 314 Ill. App. 537, 41 N.E.2d 769 (1942) ; Bartelstein
v. Goodman, 340 Ill. App. 51, 90 N.E.2d 796 (1950).
24 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §31 (1955).
25
Id. §32.
26
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §135 (1967).
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court can hear so as to do complete justice between the parties,
may be regarded as a single equitable cause of action and when
so treated as a single cause of action shall be pleaded without
being set forth in separate counts and without the use of the

term 'count.'

"127

In subsection (b) :

When actions at law and in chancery that may be prosecuted
separately are joined, the party joining the actions may, if he
desires treat them as separate causes of action, plead them in distinct counts, marked respectively 'separate action at law' and
'separate action in chancery.' This paragraph applies to answers,
counterclaims, third party claims, and any other pleadings wherever legal and equitable 28matters are permitted to be joined under
the Civil Practice Act.
As a corollary, attention should be paid to Supreme Court Rule
23229 that governs trial of equitable and legal matters. It is
obvious that although in Illinois there is a complete merger of
law and equity, there is still some distinction between these two
classes of cases.
This can be seen in General Order No. 3-5-O of the circuit
court of Cook County, dated September 8; 1967, which provides
that as to captions in chancery actions, "Every complaint or other
paper initiating any action or proceeding in the Chancery Division shall designate in the caption, below the words 'In Chancery,' the nature of the relief sought (i.e., foreclosure, partition,
etc.)." In the circuit court of Cook County, therefore, every
complaint or other paper initiating any equitable action must, in
the pleading, designate the nature of relief sought. This order
is consistent with Supreme Court Rule 1321 that requires every
complaint or other paper initiating any civil action or proceeding
to contain in its caption the words "at law," "in chancery," or
other designation conforming to the organization of the circuit
court into divisions. It is important to. observe, however, that
by Rule 132, this "[m]is-designation shall not affect the jurisdiction of the court." It would follow that mis-designation of
the relief sought will not -affect the power of a circuit court to
grant equitable relief.
The nature, quality and character of pleadings in an equity
case have been the subject of extensive literature. 3 2 Although
much that is said in the old books has now been outmoded by
-I

d.

8

2 1d.

§135(a).
§135(b).

ch. 110A, §232 (1967).
3o General Orders of the Circuit Court of Cook County, G.O. 3-5 (Effective September 11, 1967).
31 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, §132 (1967).
32 See, e.g., J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS (10th ed.
20

ILL. REV. STAT.

1892); G.
TEM

BISPTAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE SYSOF JUSTICE ADMINISTERED IN 'COURTS OF CHANCERY (8th ed. 1910);

S. PUTERBAUGH,
(6th ed. 1916).

PUTERBAUGH'S

CHANCERY

PLEADING

&

PRACTICE
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modern practice, it is still true that an equity suit may require
a different standard of fact allegation necessary to state a cause
of action. This means, in substance, that a complaint in equity
should be positive as to the facts alleged, the allegations should
be certain and specific, and facts rather than conclusions should
be pleaded.33 The practitioner should remember that only ultimate facts rather than evidentiary conclusions should be stated
4
in the equity complaint.3
In this connection, it is essential to remember that unless
the remedy sought is made exclusive by statute, equitable relief
can be obtained only Where adequate and complete legal remedy
cannot be had.3 5 To invoke the powers of a court of equity, it
has been required that it appear affirmatively from the face of
the pleadings, and from the evidence, that plaintiff has no ade36
quate remedy at law.
The practitioner should notice that the Illinois Supreme
Court has equated inadequacy and impracticality of remedy at
law with its entire absence.37 It has been held by one Illinois
appellate court that if the equitable remedy is more adequate
than the remedy at law, chancery will take jurisdiction, particularly if adequacy of the legal remedy depends on the will of the
opposing party.3 8
With regard to the adequacy of legal remedy which would
preclude grant of equitable relief, there is a variance in language
used by our reviewing courts. In one case it was held that
equitable relief will be granted unless the remedy at law is as
efficient as the remedy equity will confer under the same circumstances.3 9 In another, it was said that the aid of equity can be
3 Campbell v. Paris & D.R.R., 71 Ill.
611 (1874); Bezely v. Searl, 230
Ill. App. (1923); Hill v. Spencer, 196 Ill. 65, 63 N.E. 614 (1902); Falor v.
Doubet, 164 Ill.
App. 433 (1911) ; City of East St. Louis v. Millard, 14 Ill.
App. 483 (1884); Wolcott v. Village of Lombard, 387 Ill. 621, 57 N.E.2d
351 (1944); Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 371 Ill. 412 21 N.E.2d
294 (1939); Village of Clarendon Hills v. Century Indemnity do., 299 Ill.
App. 604, 20 N.E.2d 607 (1939).
s Fierke v. Elgin City. Banking Co., 359 Ill. 394, 194 N.E. 528 (1935);
Penn v. Fogler, 182 Ill.
76, 55 N.E. 192 (1899); William v. Soutter, 55 Ill.
130 (1870).
35 Branigar v. Village of Riverdale, 396 Ill. 534, 72,N.E.2d 201 (1947)
Rothschild v. Village of Calumet Park, 350 Ill. 330, 183 N.E. 337 (1932);
Freeman
v. Freyer, 30 Ill. App. 2d 185, 174 N.E.2d 217 (1961).
36 Camp V. Fincher, 27 Ill. 346 (1862); Hogg v. Hohmann, 330
Ill. 589,
162 N.E. 209 (1928); Dilatush v.-Salyers,
285 Ill. App. 281, 1 N.E.2d 923
I

i
(1936):
3 Branigar v. Village of Riverdale, 396 Ill. 534, 72 N.E.2d 207 (1947)
Rothschild v. Village of Calumet Park, 350 Il1. 330, 183 N.E. 337 (1932).
38 Famous Permanent Wave Shops, Inc. v. Smith, 302 Ill. App. 178,
23 N.E.2d 767 (1939) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Consento, 297 11. App.
450, 17 N.E.2d 1019 (1938).
39Jay-Bee Realty Corp. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 320 Ill.
App. 310,
50 N.E.2d 973 (1943); Goldman v. Blanksten, 240 Ill. App. 136 (1926);
Smith v. Bates Mach. Co., 79 Ill. App.'519 (1898), aff'd, 182 Il.166, 55
N.E. 69 (1899).
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invoked only in absence of adequate legal remedy."- In still another, it was said that the "adequate remedy at law" must be
clear, complete, and as practical and efficient to the ends of justice
and its administration as is the equitable remedy.41 From this
it is clear that the facts alleged, and ultimately the proof made,
must show that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. It
is not enough to allege this by way of conclusion.
Generally, grant of equitable relief is discretionary. 2 This
fact makes necessary positive allegations, and a detail of factual
statements which ordinarily are unnecessary in suits at law.
It is in this respect that a complaint which seeks equitable relief
differs from one that seeks a judgment at law. In other words,
the complaint must contain allegations so complete, so positive,
and so detailed in ultimate facts that the equity judge can be
persuaded from the allegations alone in some cases, or from the
allegations supported by proof, to grant the equitable relief.
Must the complaint be under oath?
It is old law, even before the Civil Practice Act, that "there
is no rule in Illinois requiring bills in cases of general equity
cognizance to be sworn to. '' 43 Attention should be paid to Civil
Practice Act, section 35,44 which provides for verification of
pleadings, even where none is required. The practitioner should
notice that: "If any pleading is so verified, every subsequent
pleading must also be verified, unless verification is excused by the
court."' 5 It follows, therefore, that while as a general rule an
equity complaint does not require an oath, there are exceptions.
A complaint which seeks injunctive relief must be under oath.4"
A complaint seeking appointment of a receiver must also be
supported by oath or affidavit.4 7 Other examples can be found.
It is perhaps the exceptions to the general rule that have led to
the mistaken belief of lawyers that a suit in equity must always
be under oath.
Other aspects of pleadings provided in the Civil Practice
Act fully apply to actions in equity. Motion practice is the same,
40 White v. City of Ottawa, 318 11. 463, 149 N.E. 521 (1925) ; Heinroth
v. Kochersperger, 173 Ill. 205, 50 N.E. 171 (1898); Eveland v. Board of
Educ., 340 Il1. App. 308, 92 N.E.2d 182 (1950).
41 Freeman v. Freyer, 30 Ill. App. 2d 185, 174 N.E.2d 217 (1961);
McGinnis v. First Nat'l Bank, 214 Ill. App. 295 (1919).
42 E.g., Stein v. Isse Koch & Co., 350 Ill. App. 171, 112 N.E.2d 491
(1953).
43 S.
PUTERBAUGH, PUTERBAUGH'S PLEADING & PRACTIcE 39 (6th ed.

1916).

44 "Any pleading, although not required to be sworn to, may be verified
by the oath of the party filing it or of any other person or persons having

knowledge of the facts pleaded."

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §35 (1967).

45 Id.
4' ILL. REV. STAT. ch: 69, §3 (1967).
41

E.g., Daley v. Nelson, 119 Ill. App. 627 (1905).
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with the additional observation that petitions seeking temporary
relief should conform to the requirement that allegations be positive, complete, and describe ultimate facts which will support the
relief sought. It goes without saying that provisions of the
Civil Practice Act and Supreme Court Rules governing discovery,
apply as well to suits in equity as they do to actions at law.
II.
CATEGORIES OF EQUITABLE RELIEF

Generally, it can be said that there are two kinds of equitable
relief.
1. Those provided by special statutes. For example, relief
granted by the Burnt Records Act, 48 relief against deprival of
civil rights provided in Civil Rights Act.49 There are others.
2. Those which are traditional to courts of chancery. These
include writs of injunction, specific performance of contracts,
reformation, and the like.
1.

Statutory Equitable Relief

What equitable relief is provided by statute depends on
statutory provisions. Reference must be made to the particular
statute for procedure as well as for substance. In the Burnt
Records Act,5 0 for example, courts of chancery are given power
to establish title to land where proof is made that records affecting real estate have been destroyed. Under the provided
procedure, the court has power to make all orders and enter any
judgment or decree necessary to establish title to the land. There
is a provision for filing of a petition, verification, description of
defendants, as well as consequences of perjury in connection with
such proceedings. This statute enlarges the traditional jurisdiction of courts of equity.
The Civil Rights Act 1l of Illinois contains elaborate provisions for equitable remedy to enjoin deprival of rights defined
in the statute. In the main, relief is by injunction; the mode,
however, involves application to a court for appointment of
counsel to prosecute the application for injunctive relief.
In the Eavesdropping statute, 52 there is a provision which
entitles one whose rights under the statute are violated to apply
for an injunction from any court of competent jurisdiction.
Again, the relief is by injunction, a traditional remedy in courts
of equity. There are other statutes specifically providing for
48 ILL. REV. STAT. ch
49
50

51
52

ILL. REV. STAT.

116 §14 (1967).

ch. 38,

§13-3 (1967).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, §14 (1967).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §13-3 (1967).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §14-6 (1967).
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equitable relief.53 To these the practitioner should turn, with the
admonition that when a case falls within a special law providing
for equitable relief, first read the statute, then think great
thoughts!
2.

Traditional Equitable Remedies
Equitable remedies traditionally granted in courts of chancery differ from each other in many respects. In some the difference is procedural; in others it is substantive. A detailed
discussion of each will disclose these differences and reveal the
elements which must be present in each case before it can qualify
for equitable relief.
(a) Injunction Orders
Injunction orders are distinguishable in two ways: as to
their duration and as to their mode of function. As to duration,
an injunction can take the form of a temporary restraining order, a temporary injunction, or a permanent injunction. As to
mode of function, an injunction can be either prohibitory or
mandatory. In point of time, the earliest form of injunctive
relief in an equity proceeding is the temporary restrainingeio6rder.
Because of this feature, we will first discuss the essential elements of this form-of equitable relief..
(i) The TempOrary Restraining Order
.The temporary restraining order is new in Illinois; the
concept, however, is old.25 This remedy is provided by the 1967
amendment to the Injunction statute which is patterned after
Federal Rule 65 (b) .
.
Before a temporary. restraining order can issue, the following elements must be present:.
1. Danger, shown by affidavit or by verified complaint, that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage Will result
unless the order is issued.
2. Need to maintain the status quo until..:an application for a
temporary injunction can be made.
3. If the application is.,
without. notice, need that the temporary
restraining order i's se before notice can be served.
The -1967 amendment Js detailed and specific. Its provi9ions must be followed if a valid temporary restraining order is
to issue., Although the amendment infuses into Illinois law a
neW .oncept in injunctive relief, there are'no Illinois cases construing this kind of injunctive relief. Therefore, we must refer
S3E.g., ch. 82, §§1, et seq., the liens-act;-ch. 95,-§§23-to-23.11, Illinois
mortage and foreclosure act; ch. 10i;'H§§1, et seq., nuisances; ch. 140, §§828, protection
of trademarks.
54
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, §3-1 (1967).,
55E.g., Perry v. Eson, 8 Ill. App. 2d 423, 132 N.E.2d .66 (1956).
56 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
"
I
.
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to decisions of other jurisdictions for an explanation of the function and meaning of a temporary restraining order. Since the
amendment is verbatim the federal rule, decisions of federal
5
courts are helpful. 7
Generally, a temporary restraining order is issued without
notice.5 8 It is effective only until an application for an injunction can be heard. In contrast, a temporary injunction is usually
issued with notice and it is effective until trial on the merits can
be had. The distinction between a temporary restraining order
and a temporary injunction is that the former maintains the
status quo until hearing can be had on an application for a
temporary injunction. The latter maintains the status quo until
trial on the merits can be had and a permanent injunction either
issued or denied.5 9
Section 3-1 provides that no temporary restraining order can
be obtained without notice to the adverse party unless it clearly
appears, by affidavit or verified complaint, that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss or damage will result before notice can
be served and a hearing had on; the application 6 Everyterporary restraining order granted without notice must contain
an endorsement of the date and hour of its issuance.6 1 It must
be filed forthwith in the office of':the clerk and made of record.
It must define the injury and state why it isirreparable, and the
order must contain findings of facts by the court that will show
why the order was issued without notice.62 The order by.its own
terms will expire in 10 days unless, within a time fixed by the
order and for good cause, it is extended for a like period or the
party against whom the order is entered consents to its exten63
sion.
When a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, it must contain a setting of the motion for the preliminary
injunction at the earliest possible time.6 4 Hearing on the motion
for temporary injunction takes precedence over all other matters,
except cases of a like kind and of the same character. If the
party who obtains the temporary restraining order does not proceed with the application for preliminary injunction, the court
shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. 65
57 Lunkenheimer Co. v. Condec Corp ,-268--F.-Supp.- -667--(S.D.N.Y.
1967); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 978 (D.D.C.
'
.. ...I
. ..
.. .
19 52 ) .
58
59 E.g., Swaim v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 233, 171 N.E. 871 (1930).

1963).

E.g., Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc.,,316 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.

60 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, §3-1 (1967).
61 Id.

62 Id.
63
Id.
64 1d.
65 Id.
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The 1967 amendment to the Injunction Act also provides
that the party against whom the order issues may on 2 days'
notice to the party who obtained the order, or on such shorter
notice as the court may prescribe, move for dissolution or modification. The court shall proceed expeditiously to hear and de6
termine the motion to dissolve.
The amendment takes into account what is generally said
of injunctive relief. Injunctions, whether in the form of pre6
For this
liminary or temporary orders, are drastic remediesY.
reason, Section 3-1 requires that every temporary restraining
order set forth the reasons for its issuance, be specific in terms,
describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained.
A temporary restraining order is binding only on the parties to
the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise. 8 With the exception of a governmental office or agency or where a judgment is enjoined, before
a temporary restraining order issues, the plaintiff shall give bond
in such sum, and upon such condition and with such security as
the court may require for payment of cost and damages which
may be incurred or suffered by a party who is found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained. A temporary restraining
order issued without bond is void.6 9 The present state of Illinois
law on this subject is such that the safest course for the practitioner is to see that a bond is furnished in every case in which a
temporary restraining order issues. There is room for argument that this construction of the injunction act infringes on
judicial power. This contention should be relegated to those who
fashion law; for the pragmatist, the practitioner, a bond is indispensable to the validity of a temporary restraining order.
(ii) The Temporary Injunction
There are several terms used in referring to a temporary
injunction. Sometimes it is called injunction pendente lite. °
Often it is called an interlocutory injunction. 71 On occasion the
term used is preliminary injunction.12 By any name, a tem66

Id.

E.g. Admiral Trailer Mfg. Co. v. All States Trailer Co., 351 Ill. App.
513, 115 N.E.2d 560 (1953) (Abstract).
68 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, §3-1 (1967).
Ill. App. 2d -, 246 N.E.2d
69 Belpedio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 822 (1969); Hoffman v. City of Evanston, 101 Ill. App. 2d 440, 243 N.E.2d
478 (1968). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, §§8-9 (1967).
70 E.g., H. A. Hillmer Co. v. Behr 196 Ill. App. 363 (1915).
71 E.g., People ex rel. Bolton v. Progressive Gen. Ins. Co., 84 11. App.
2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 152 (1967).
67

72

Id.
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porary injunction is an order of a court directing a person to do
or refrain from doing a particular act. The office of a temporary
injunction is to preserve the status quo until a final hearing. 73
In order to qualify for a temporary injunction, a case must
possess the following elements:
1. Notice of the time and place of the application, unless it clearly
appears, from specific facts shown by the verified complaint or
by an affidavit, that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or
damage will result before notice can be served and hearing had.
2. Showing, by allegations or proof, that there is likelihood of success in proving the right to the ultimate relief sought.
3. Showing that the balance of convenience favors granting of the
temporary injunction.
4. Showing that the status quo must be maintained until hearing
of the cause on the merits if irreparable injury to the applicant
is to be prevented.
5. Showing that the applicant has not engaged in any conduct that
disqualifies him from the equitable relief of a temporary injunction.
6. Conditions that would serve to protect the party against whom
the temporary injunction is issued. Usually, the condition is
the giving of bond, on such terms as the court in its discretion
may determine.
A temporary injunction can be either prohibitory or mandatory. Temporary mandatory injunctions are rarely issued. It
has been said that while a court of equity is always reluctant to
grant an interlocutory mandatory injunction, it will do so in
an extreme case where right to such relief is clearly established
and the claimed invasion results in serious injury.14 The reason
for strictures against temporary mandatory injunctions is that
by its nature it terminates the litigation. Nonetheless, it is not
true that temporary mandatory injunctions are never issued.
There appears to be an easy tendency on the part of practitioners to believe that a temporary injunction can be readily
obtained without notice. Some even urge issuance of a temporary injunction both without notice and without bond. Illinois
courts of review have consistently held that our law does not
favor granting injunctions without notice.7 5 Section 3 of the
Injunction Act requires giving of notice, except in the unusual
situation where it appears from complaint or affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury will result.7
The exceptional case is easily recognized.

Where giving of

7 Dunne v. County of Rock Island, 228 Ill. 359, 123 N.E. 501 (1919);
Nestor Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Goldblatt, 371 Il. 570, 21 N.E.2d 723 (1939).
74Ambassador Foods Corp. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 43 Ill.
App. 2d 100, 192 N.E.2d 572 (1963); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Perrine, 351 Ill. App. 195, 114 N.E.2d 572 (1953).
7 Streamwood Homebuilders, Inc. v. Brolin, 25 I1. App. 2d 39, 165
N.E.2d 531 (1960); Miollis v. Schneider, 77 Ill. App. 2d 420, 222 N.E.2d
715 (1966).
71, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, §3 (1967).
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notice will itself be productive of the mischief apprehended, a
court of equity will award a temporary injunction without notice,
even before service. of summons.and complaint. 7 The applicant,
however, has the burden of establishing that his case falls within
an exception to the general rule.
Snell, speaking of English equity practice, said that "It is
impossible to enumerate all the cases in which the remedy by
way of injunction is available."17 This statement is equally true
of Illinois equity. Without attempting an. exhaustive list of the
kinds of cases which can qualify for temporary injunctive relief, the following are the more important kinds calling for this
type of equitable remedy.
Equity will enjoin the breach of a negative covenant.' It
will be noticed that this is the converse of the equitable remedy
of specific performance. 'Thus, a temporary injunction will issue
in a case involving a claim that the defendant agreed not to carry
on a certain trade in connection with the sale of his interest in a
business2 ° A: temporary injunction will issue to restrain the
violation of covenants concerning land.81 In this connection, it
should be remembered that the origin of equity jurisdiction in
injunctions seemsto 2have been from the old common law writ of
8
prohibition of waste

'A temporary injunction will issue to restrain a threatened
or apprehended trespass. 3 It is ancient equity law that a temporary injunction will issue to restrain a nuisance.14 The passing

off, of trademarks or trade names can be restrained by a temporary injunction.8 5 Infringement of patents, designs and copyrights can be protected by a temporary injunction.,6 Use and

abuse of confidential information can support the issuance of
temporary injunctionY.8 Expulsion from voluntary associations
can be protected by a temporary injunction under certain cir77

Miollis v. Schneider, 77 Ill. App. 2d 420, 222 N.E.2d 715 (1966);

Sprague v. Monarch Book Co., 105 Ill. App. 530 (1903).
78 SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 594 (25th ed. R. Megarry & P.
Baker 1960).
7" Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 360 Ill. 638, 196 N.E. 799
(1935); Bartholomae & Roesing Brewing & Malting Co. v. Modzelewski,

269 111: 539, 109 N.E. 1058 (1915).
80 E.g., Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 Ill.2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329 (1956).

E.g., Housing Authority of Gallatin County v. Church of God, 401
Ill. 100, 81 N.E.2d 500 (1948).
8- :-'E:.q.Wise v.Potofiac -Nat'Bafnk, 393-1li. 357, 65 N.E.2d 767 (1946).
83 E.g., Fidler v. Roberts, 41 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1930).
84 E.g., People v.,Mussatto, 216 Ill. App. 519 (1920).
85 E.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Free Sewing Mach. Co., 256 F.2d
806 8(7th Cir. 1958).
1.E.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Overland Motor Co., 28 F.2d 306 (N.D.
Ill. 1928), aff'd, 30 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1929).
87 E.g., House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 58 Ill. App. 2d 431, 208 N.E.2d
390 (1965).
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cumstances8 a
Finally, within well-known exceptions, judicial
proceedings can be restrained by a temporary order.8 9
For the practitioner, it is important to remember that application for a temporary injunction is directed to the conscience
and sound discretion of the court. Grant or refusal of a temporary injunction rests largely in the discretion of the chancellorO° A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court ruling on
an application for a temporary injunction unless there is a
showing that discretion was abused. Particularly is this true
where the injunction ruling follows notice, hearing, and provision for bond.
It should be observed that the chance of sustaining the grant
of a temporary injunction is greater after notice and hearing
of evidence. In other words, it is difficult to show abuse of
discretion where the temporary injunction issues without notice9l or without hearing of evidence.1 2 Therefore, in any important case, the practitioner should give notice and support the
application with evidence at a hearing.
It is also easier to support the grant of a temporary injunction on giving of proper bond, or submission to conditions
that are fair, reasonable and which tend to protect the rights
of the party against whom the temporary order issues.9 3
Finally, it is important that the provisions of Section 3-1
of the Injunction Act, as amended in 1967, be carefully followed
and the reasons for the temporary injunction spelled out. In
other words, a temporary order should contain the reasons for its
issuance as found by the court. The order should be clear as to
its operation and effect, it should not be ambiguous, and it should
be free from doubt in every respect.
Under our practice, the initial responsibility for the draft9
ing of a temporary injunction order is that of the practitioner. 4
The ultimate responsibility for accuracy of the order is that of
the chancellor. It is a mark of professional responsibility, however, for the practitioner to prepare an order which is in com88 Parsons College v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, 271 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. I1. 1967) ; cf. Werner v. International Ass'n
of Machinists, 11 Ill. App. 2d 258, 137 N.E.2d 100 (1956).
89 E.g., People ex rel. Lake County Bar Ass'n v. Circuit Court of Lake
County, 31 Ill.2d 170, 201 N.E.2d 109 (1964).
90 E.g., Naxon Telesign Corp. v. Selig, 38 Ill. App. 2d 242, 186 N.E.2d 666
(1962).
91 E.g., Christian Hosp. v. People ex rel. Murphy, 223 11. 244, 79 N.E.
(1906).
92
E.g., Ableman v. Slader, 80 Ill. App. 2d 94, 224 N.E.2d 569 (1967).
93 Naxon Telesign Corp. v. Selig, 38 Ill. App. 2d 242, 186 N.E.2d 666
(1962); Sunset Hills Homeowners Assoc. v. Karel, 39 Ill. App. 2d 477, 189
N.E.2d
.41 (1963).
94
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §271 (1967).
See also 52 ILL. BAR J. 480
(1964).
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pliance not only with the words but the spirit of the Injunction
Act.
How should the motion for temporary injunction be made?
Procedure for injunctive orders depends on local practice.
In most Illinois circuits, the clerk dockets the complaint and
assigns it to one of the circuit court judges for a hearing in
accordance with court rules. In Cook County, where there is
a chancery division, the case is docketed by the clerk as a chancery proceeding and sent to the chief judge for assignment. If
the application for temporary injunction is an emergency one
without notice, the assignment clerk on the staff of the chief
judge of the division will instruct plaintiff's counsel concerning
the judge to whom the case is assigned. Either that clerk, or the
lawyer for the plaintiff, can take the file to that judge and request an emergency hearing.
Even in an ex parte hearing, the better practice is for
plaintiff's lawyer to have affidavits in support of his application and witnesses to support the claim for temporary emergency relief. In the well-handled case, a court reporter should
be available to record the testimony of witnesses and the representations counsel makes to the court concerning reasons
for dispensing with notice. Experience shows that a temporary injunction issued without notice but supported by a
record which preserves the evidence heard and the hearing
had on the emergency application, stands a better chance of being
sustained on appeal, if one is taken. The practitioner should
bear in mind that on being served with the injunction order, the
party against whom the order issues can move to dissolve it.
An order denying the motion to dissolve is appealable under the
provisions of Supreme Court Rule 307.
If the application for temporary injunction is with notice,
the practitioner should be prepared to support the hearing with
testimony of witnesses. Again, a court reporter to record the
proceedings will aid in sustaining the order of the trial court if
a temporary injunction issues. Here too, attention is called to
Supreme Court Rule 307 which provides that: "An appeal may
be taken to the appellate court from an interlocutory order (1)
granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve
or modify an injunction; . ... "
Should there be caution in applying for a temporary injunction? Certainly.
It should always be remembered that a temporary injunction obtained merely to please a client can lead to painful results.
As has already been made clear, every temporary injunction
must be supported by a bond. The purpose of the bond is to
assure that the person against whom the temporary injunction
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issues does not suffer damage as a result of the order25 Section
12 of the Injunction Act provides that upon dissolution of a
wrongfully issued temporary injunction, the party enjoined is
entitled to a hearing and to award of damages on proof that he
was injured by the order.9 6 The motion to dissolve must be
made promptly; and the motion for hearing on damages must
comply with the provisions of section 12 of the Injunction Act.
The motion cannot be made after entry of a final decree
against the defendant 97 and the statute has application only to
dissolution of a temporary injunction.2
Despite these limitations, the practitioner is well advised to be circumspect, as well
as cautious, in the application for a temporary injunction because as our courts of review have said, an injunction, temporary
or permanent, is a drastic remedy which can injure those persons
against whom it is issued.
(iii)
The Permanent Injunction
A permanent injunction is a final decree directing a person
to do or refrain from doing a particular act.99 The difference
between a temporary and a permanent injunction is that the
former maintains the status quo; and the latter disposes of the
suit. In order to qualify for a permanent injunction, a case must
possess the following elements:
1. Proof that a permanent injunction is necessary to protect the
property or civil right involved.
2. Proof that money damages as an alternative remedy is inadequate.
3. Proof that some person, legal or natural, will respond to the
injunctive command. Equity acts in personam.
Although a permanent injunction is sometimes referred to
as perpetual, it is subject to termination. Courts of equity, even
after passage of the 30 day period for appeal, have the power to
modify, vacate, or set aside a permanent injunction if changed
conditions of fact or law justify such action.'0 0 In this sense
the oft-stated notion that a permanent injunction is a perpetual
one is subject to qualifications.
With regard to the kind of acts that can be the subject of a
permanent injunction, this scope is the same as for a temporary
9"Schaefer v. Stephens - Adamson Mfg. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 310, 183
N.E.2d 575 (1962) ; John Deere Co. v. Hinrichs, 36 Ill. App. 2d 255, 183
N.E.2d
309 (1962).
9
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, §12 (1967).

9, E.g., Schien v. City of Virden, 5 Ill.2d 494, 126 N.E.2d 201 (1955).
98 Official Aviation Guide Co. v. American Aviation Associates, 162 F.2d
541 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Schien v. City of Virden, 5 Ill.2d 494, 126 N.E.2d 201
(1955).
99 E.g., Baton Rouge Bldg. Trades Council v. T. L. James & Co., 201 La.
749, 10 So.2d 606 (1942).
100 E.g. Field v. Field, 79 Ill. App. 2d 355, 223 N.E2d. 551 (1967).
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injunction. In a general way, these have been discussed; therefore, that discussion need not be repeated here. 101
The trial of a suit for permanent injunction is governed by
the rules of civil practice. Because of the nature of the relief,
before a permanent injunction is granted the right of the plain02
tiff to such relief should be established clearly and affirmatively.
It is a general rule, often applied in the cases, that before an
injunction can issue by a final decree, there must be a clear
showing of violation of the rights of the plaintiff and it must
also appear clearly that the plaintiff will suffer specific injury
by reason of such violation.1 0 3 Often, the nature of the act sought
to be enjoined affects the standard of proof required of the
plaintiff to show entitlement to injunctive relief by a final decree.
As in the case of temporary injunctive orders, the initial
responsibility for preparing a decree for permanent injunction
rests on the practitioner. Of course, the ultimate responsibility
for entry of the decree is that of the chancellor. The practitioner
can aid in the discharge of this responsibility through preparation of an adequate decree, clear and specific in its terms, with
plain and definitive language with regard to the nature of the
act enjoined and parties to be affected thereby.
It is generally said that a decree in equity need not contain
findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, -a distinction
should be made between a decree in equity and a final decree
granting a permanent injunction. It has long been the law of
Illinois that a decree granting an injunction, whether temporary
or permanent, must be as clear and as explicit as the record can
support. There should be no doubt concerning the injunctive
relief, the person or persons enjoined, and the acts subject of
the order. Because of these requirements, great care should be
given to the preparation and submission of a decree granting a
permanent injunction.
(b)

Specific Performance of Contracts
Specific performance is an equitable remedy which compels
substantial performance of a contract in a way that will do
justice between the parties.'0 4 To qualify for the equitable
remedy of specific performance a case must possess the following elements:
1. There must be a contract, clear, definite, and unequivocal in
its terms, not vague or uncertain in any of its essential particulars.
101 See text at notes 70-98 supra.
102 Allott v. American Strawboard

Co., 237 Ill. 55, 86 N.E. 685 (1908);
Wilson-Broadway Bldg. Corp. v. Northwestern Elevated R.R., 225 Il. App.
306 (1922).
lO3E.g.. Schubach v. McDonald, 179 Mo. 163, 78 S.W. 1020 (1903).
104E.g., Powell v. Huey, 145 Ill. App. 477 (1908), aff'd, 241 Ill. 132,
89 N.E. 299 (1909).
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2. There must be allegations and proof that the subject matter of
the contract is unique.
3. There must be proof showing facts which in equity and good
conscience entitles the plaintiff to a decree for specific performance.
The cardinal requirement for specific performance is proof
of a contract that is clear, specific and fair. Substantively, the
subject of the contract must possess a quality which would make
specific enforcement the only adequate remedy. 1 If it appears,
either from allegations or proof, that damages at law will give
the compensation entitled, or will put the complaining party in
the same position as he would be if the agreement were specifically enforced, equity will not interfere.106
There must also be proof that there is mutuality of remedy.
Want of mutual remedy at the inception of the contract is not
a bar to relief by specific performance. 1" Yet, it is generally
the rule in Illinois that where mutuality is lacking, courts of
equity will aid neither party by specific enforcement of the
contract. 10 8 There is authority for the assertion, however, that
the Illinois law of specific performance has gathered a growing
and developing body of exceptions which cast doubt on the doctrine of mutuality.10 9
The subject matter of the contract is important in determining whether specific performance will be decreed. It is
commonly said that where the thing contracted for has unique
value, one element of specific performance is present. Traditionally, in English and in American law, land has always
been considered a subject which will justify specific performance.
It is said that land has the unique characteristic of irreplacea110
bility.
Generally, contracts for personal service will not be specifically enforced." 1 A contract for the sale of a rare piece of
art can be the subject of equitable relief by specific performance.
In other words, where the subject of the contract cannot be duplicated either because of its kind, quality, or value, equity will
grant specific performance because in the nature of things damages at law are not adequate.
There is no inflexible rule that controls grant of specific
105 Besinger v. National Tea Co., 75 I1. App. 2d 395, 221 N.E.2d 156
(1966); King Mechanism & Engineering Co. v. Western Wheeled Scraper
o:, 59 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1932).
106 E.g., Linder v. Potier, 409 Ill. 407, 100 N.E.2d 602 (1951) ; Tascher
v. Timerman, 67 Ill. App. 568 (1896).
107 E.g., Gould v. Stelter, 14 Ill.2d 376, 152 N.E.2d 869 (1958).
108 E.g., Swanson v. Lederer, 159 1ll. App. 547 (1911).
10 9 See 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 409, 416 (1950).
110 Id.

at 410.

'L1 Oswald v. Nehls, 233 Ill. 438, 84 N.E. 619 (1908) ; Annot., 135 A.L.R.

279 (1941).
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performance. 12 Each case must be decided on its own facts.
As in the case of equitable remedies in general, grant or denial
of specific performance rests in the sound judicial discretion of
the court, exercised consistent with the facts and circumstances
113
of the case.
In some Illinois cases, particularly those involving contracts
for the sale of land, it is said that specific performance is a
matter of right and not a favor. Our reviewing courts look to
determine whether the surrounding circumstances show a voluntary and freely executed contract, fair in its terms, so that
justice requires it be specifically enforced in accordance with the
agreement of the parties.
It is not true, as often thought by practitioners, that the
contract must be in writing. An oral contract can be specifically
enforced if there is clear and satisfactory evidence of the agreement.114 Even contracts for the sale of land, if oral, will be
specifically enforced if they fall outside the Statute of Frauds.
Every practitioner should look carefully at the facts to determine whether performance or other Statute of Frauds exceptions
will make an oral contract to lease or sell land a subject of
specific performance. The doctrine, oft-expressed in courts of
equity that the Statute of Frauds will not be applied so as to
be an instrument of fraud, 1 5 is a concept that has application
in a myriad of situations. It is not possible nor practicable to
enumerate here all the possibilities.
Contracts for the sale or lease of land have another characteristic worth noting. Courts of equity will specifically enforce
them even though it may appear that money damages will give
the plaintiff a complete remedy.""
With regard to specific performance, contracts for personal
property stand on a different footing. In this kind of case it
is easier to establish that damages at law are adequate. Yet,
some peculiar attribute of the contract subject will render this
defense ineffective. Thus, a court of equity will order specific
performance of an agreement for the sale and purchase of corporate stock which cannot be bought in the open market.1 7 So
too, specific performance will be ordered when there is a contract for the sale of an article of unusual beauty or rarity.
There was a time in Anglo-American law when courts of
112 Edmonds v. Gourley, 362 Ill. 147, 199 N.E. 287 (1935); Zempel v.
Hughes, 235 Ill. 424, 85 N.E. 641 (1908).
113 E.g., Fitzpatrick v. Allied Contracting Co., 24 Ill.2d 448, 182 N.E.2d
183 (1962).

114 E.g., Cole v. Cole, 1.06 Ill. 482 (1883).

Ropacki v. Ropacki, 354 Ill. 502, 188 N.E. 400 (1933); Gladville v.
McDole, 247 Ill. 34, 93 N.E. 86 (1910).
115

116 E.g., Brand v. Svenson, 170 Ill. App. 54 (1912).

117E.g., Smurr v. Kamen, 301 Il1. 179, 133 N.E. 715 (1921).
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equity did not have jurisdiction to award damages for breach
of a contract. Thus a plaintiff who began an action in equity for
specific performance had to file a separate suit at law to recover
damages." s
Now, modern equity practice in courts like those
of Illinois can award damages in lieu of or in addition to
specific performance. If a cause of action for specific performance is alleged, but the proof shows that either in part or in
whole damages at law should be awarded, our courts can award
damages, in whole or in part. 119 The measure recoverable for
breach of contract may be either nominal or substantial, depending on the facts of the given case.
Finally, it should be mentioned that there are contracts
which cannot qualify for the equitable relief of specific performance. For example, illegal or immoral contracts will not be
specifically enforced." 0 A court of equity will not enforce antenuptial agreements which are contrary to public policy, or in
violation of laws governing marital relations. 1
A court of
equity will not enforce an agreement that is involuntary or without consideration.2 2 Contracts for interests that are tenuous or
transient will not be enforced by specific performance. Also,
agreements for service of a personal kind and skill will not be
specifically enforced.' 2 3 Finally, it should be said that courts of
equity will not enforce contracts which require constant super24
vision.
In this connection, however, it should be said that in one
developing area of the law, that is, law governing rights and
obligations in the building industry, exceptions have been engrafted into those concepts which have dictated denial of specific
performance. For example, if a contract to build is clearly
defined by contract, or the plaintiff has a substantial interest
in performance of the contract so that damages cannot compensate him, or if the defendant is in possession of the land so
that the plaintiff cannot employ another to build, there is authority that such contracts will be specifically enforced.2 5
Quite often, an action for specific performance will be
118 E.g., Doan v. Mauzey, 33 Ill. 227 (1864).
119 Alter v. Mollenkamp, 23 Ill.2d 502, 179 N.E.2d 7 (1961) ; Lenti v.

Colomb, 74 Ill. App. 2d 94, 220 N.E.2d 65 (1966).
120 E.g., C. D. Gammon Co. v. Standard Trust & Sav. Bank, 327 Ill. 489,
158 N.E. 810 (1927).
1"1 Seuss v. Schkat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934) ; Kuhnen v. Kuhnen,
351 Ill. 591, 184 N.E. 874 (1933).
122 Swirsky v. Horwich, 320 Il.
App. 568, 51 N.E.2d 822 (1943); Lindberg Mach. Works v. Lindberg, 305 Ill. App. 543, 27 N.E.2d 565 (1940).
123 Cowen v. McNealy, 342 Ill. App. 179, 96 N.E.2d 100 (1950); Rabinovich v. Reith, 120 Ill. App. 409 (1905); Suburban Const. Co. v. Naugle, 70
Ill. App. 384 (1897).
124 E.g., Langson v. Goldberg, 298 Ill. App. 229, 18 N.E.2d 729 (1939),
aff'd, 373 Ill. 297, 26 N.E.2d 111 (1940) ; Schmitt v. King, 234 Ill. App. 335
(1924).
125 E.g., Klingbeil v. Blecklenberg, 249 Ill. App. 39 (1928).
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coupled with one for injunction. It has been held in Illinois that
a wide measure of discretion is allowed a trial court when request is made for a temporary decree of specific performance
or a temporary mandatory injunction in the Same suit.126 In
such cases, the application for injunctive relief is in a separate
count. Often, it is necessary to apply for a temporary injunction
to restrain disposal of the subject matter of the contract until
hearing can be had on the cause of action for specific performance. This is an instance in which two forms of equitable
relief can be made the subject of one suit.
(c)

Rescission of Contracts
In strict sense, rescission is not an equitable remedy.

Rescission is the right of a party under some circumstances to set
aside the transaction by making restitution 27

When the right

exists, it is a cancellation of the contract.
It is best, however, to discuss rescission as an equitable
remedy because the action requires judicial determination and

assistance in effectuating the right.

For example, a court of

equity can compel accounting, make allowances for changes in
condition of property subject of the contract, and determine
the circumstances under which restitution must be completed.
Before rescission of a contract can be effectuated by a
decree in equity, the following elements must be present:
1. Fraudulent, and in some instances, innocent misrepresentation
in the inducement of the contract.
2. Failure of consideration, either in total or to an extent that
would make the contract unconscionable.
3. Substantial failure of performance, or breach of the party
against whom rescission is asserted.
4. In a contract for the sale of land, substantial misdescription
of the property.
It is a universal rule of contract law that an agreement once
made can be rescinded only by mutual assent of both parties,
unless the right to rescind rests on one of the recognized
grounds.2 1 Parties to a contract may, by mutual agreement,
rescind. In such cases, the agreement to rescind is adequate consideration. 29 A written contract may be rescinded by an oral
10
one.
126 Ambassador Foods Corp. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 43 Il. App.
2d 100, 192 N.E.2d 572 (1963); Morris v. Patterson, 311 Ill.
App. 657, 37
N.E.2d 918 (1941).
127 Horan v. Blowitz, 13 Ill.2d 126, 148 N.E.2d 445 (1958); Mourant v.
Pullman Trust & Sav. Bank, 314 Ill. App. 567;41 N.E.2d 1006 (1942). For
an extended discussion of one aspect of rescission, see Newman, Relief for
Mistake in Contracting, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 232 (1969).
128 Bowser, Inc. v. Hamilton Glass Co., 207 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1953);
Lane v. Brooks, 120 Ill. App. 501 (1905).
129 Printing Mach. Maintenance, Inc. v. Carton Prod. Co., 15 Ill. App. 2d
543, 147 N.E.2d 443 (1957); Dickson v. Owens, 134 Ill. App. 561 (1907).
130 Thorsen v. Hansen Constr. Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 1, 151 N.E.2d 421
(1958); Milligan v. Hinebaugh, 70 Ill. App. 537 (1896).
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Where one party to a contract repudiates it, either expressly
or tacitly by refusing to perform, the contracting party not in
default has the right to rescind and be restored to his former
status. On the other hand, a party to a contract who has the
right to rescind but who proceeds with performance, foregoes
1
the right of rescission.

31

It is a universal rule that before a party to a contract can
rescind, he must return or offer to return the goods or money
received by him as a result of the contract. 132 What is returned
must be unchanged in condition and amount so that the other
party is placed in as good a position as he was before the contract was made. There are very few exceptions to this general
rule. In fact, it can be safely said that in any contract which
results either in the exchange of property or the payment of
money, before resort to judicial assistance to effectuate rescission,
it must be alleged and proved that there was a return or an
offer to return the money or property received by the contract. 1 33
The practitioner must look to determine whether the contract is an executed or executory one. In executed contracts,
the party who seeks to rescind must return the benefits 'of the
contract before he can obtain the assistance of a court of equity.13
If the contract is an executory one, whatever tangible benefits
are received, up to the time the act of rescission is asserted,
must be returned or essential allegations and proof be made to
explain failure to return the benefits received. Even in cases of
a contract secured by fraud, it is generally said that one may
not keep the fruits of the contract and at the same time repudiate135it on the ground that he was fraudulently induced to make
it.
The point is that a court of equity will look to see if the
1
parties can be returned to their pre-contract status.
There is one old Illinois case which holds that where a release was obtained by fraud on the payment of a small sum of
money, it was not necessary that the victim of the fraud return
1 37
the money before bringing suit on his original cause of action.
This case is illustrative of the distinction between asserting the
131 Lichter v. Goss, 232 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Plummer v. Worthington, 321 Ill.
450, 152 N.E. 133 (1926); Therm-O-Proof Insulation Mfg.
Co. v. Hoffman, 329 Ill.
App. 645, 69 N.E.2d 725 (1946); City of Chicago v.
Chicago Rys. Co., 228 Ill.
App. 579 (1923).
132 Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill.
14, 91 N.E. 683 (1910) ; Wollenberger
v. Hoover, 346 Ill.
511, 179 N.E. 42 (1931); Lees v. Akshun Mfg. Co., 205
F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1953).
133E.g., Duncan v. Humphries, 58 Ill.
App. 440 (1895); Ellington v.
King, 49 Ill.
449 (1869).
134 E.g., Smith v. Brittenham, 98 II1. 188 (1881).
135 Collett v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 81 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Ill.
1948);
Hustad v. Cerny, 321 Ill.
354, 151 N.E. 871 (1926).
136 Huiller v. Ryan, 306 Il1. 88, 137 N.E. 484 (1922) ; Bingham v. Bell
& Zoller Coal Co., 175 Ill.
App. 469 (1912).
137 E.g., Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 109 Ill.
120 (1884).
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right to rescind and asserting the right to sue on an original
claim.
The right to rescind a contract comes into being as a right
arising from the conduct of the other party. 138 However, to
rescind or cancel a contract, the right has to be exercised
promptly on discovery of the facts which give rise to the right.
The election to rescind must be made promptly.1 9 If the right
is not asserted promptly, it is waived. 140 It has been held that
a delay of 17 months in filing suit after discovery of the alleged
fraud was unreasonable.14 1 One who waits four years before
2
taking steps to rescind a contract for fraud, is guilty of laches.11
One who desires to rescind a contract for mistake or fraud, but
who engages in unnecessary delay after obtaining the necessary
knowledge, will defeat his right to equitable relief. In other
words, a party who claims the right to rescind cannot stand
inactive after learning of the grounds for action.
How is the right to rescind asserted?
Bringing of a suit is equivalent to disaffirmance and au14 3
thorizes the other party to treat the contract as rescinded.
Prior to suit, a notice of intention to rescind is adequate when
followed by suit to effectuate it. If a contract contains provisions
for rescission, the contract must be performed with regard to
notice and other provisions which will serve to notify the other
party of the election to rescind. It has been said that any
course of conduct which shows the intention to rescind is suf1 44
ficient.
A contract cannot be rescinded in part and enforced in part.
It is generally the rule in Illinois that a contract must be repudiated in toto or not at all. 145 It should be noted, however, that
this rule does not apply to severable contracts. 4
Situations are
numerous in which agreements can be separated, one from the
other. In such instances, rescission can be of one agreement and
performance insisted as to another agreement which is part of
the undertaking. Thus, it has been held in Illinois that where
a contract is one of a number, a party may rescind for fraud as
138

1953).

E.g., Bowser, Inc. v. Hamilton Glass Co., 207 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.

139 Lichter v. Goss, 232 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Worthey v. Cleveland,
Cinn., C & S. L. Ry. Co., 251 Ill. App. 585 (1929) ; Lipkin v. Burnstine, 18
Ill. App. 2d 509, 152 N.E.2d 745 (1958).
140 Heald v. Wright, 75 Ill. 17 (1874) ; Mound City Distilling Co. v. Consolidated Adjustment Co., 152 Ill. App. 155 (1909).
141 E.g., Cox v. Montgomery, 36 Ill. 396 (1865).
142 E.g., Brown v. Brown, 142 Ill. 409, 32 N.E. 500 (1892).
143 E.g., Herrington v. Hubbard, 2 Ill. 569 (1839).
144 E.g., Holbrook v. Electric Appliance Co., 90 Ill. App. 86 (1899).
145 Noth v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 211 Ill. App. 94 (1918); Stromberg v. Western Tel. Const. Co., 86 Ill. App. 270 (1900).
146 Olson v. Eulette, 322 Ill. App. 178, 74 N.E.2d 609 (1947);
Maney
Milling Co.%v. Baker-Wignall & Co., 186 Ill. App. 390 (1914).
"
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to part of the contract, but he need not rescind the contract as
1 7
a whole. 4
The effect of rescission is to deny the party that asserts
it any right under the agreement. Once rescission is elected,
even without cause, the party who so acts cannot renew the
contract without consent of the other party. In other words,
since rescission is cancellation of a contract, it results in waiver
of all rights under the agreement by the party who asserts the
148
right.
A suit in equity to effectuate rescission of a contract is an
application for judicial assistance to enforce the right to rescind.
The burden is on the party who claims the right to show it
exists. Whether, in effectuating rescission, other forms of
equitable relief are necessary will depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. In some, injunction is sought, while
in others injunctive relief and accounting will serve to restore
the parties to their original position. In any event, the elementary principles of equity jurisdiction apply since the burden of
the party who acts to rescind is to establish the right under the
circumstances .149
Cancellation of Instruments
One of the oldest of the equitable remedies is delivery up
and cancellation of instruments. 1 50 In its classical form, this
equitable relief will be ordered where a document appears to be
valid but is in fact void or voidable. Where it appears that the
existence of the document itself may be embarrassing, or some
claim will be made on it to the injury of a party, or some deception may be practiced by, with or through the document, a
court of equity will assume jurisdiction and order the document
delivered up and cancelled. 5 1 In modern equity, the tendency has
been to entertain suits for cancellation of instruments when the
claim for this relief rests, not on the invalidity of the document
25
or instrument, but rather on the circumstances of its creation. 2
Thus, as this form of equitable relief has developed, it has paralleled suits to effectuate rescission of contracts. Before there can
be a case for the equitable relief of cancellation of instruments,
the following elements must be present:
(d)

147 E.g., Olson v. Eulette, 332 Il1. App. 178, 74 N.E.2d 609 (1947).
148 Friedman v. City of Chicago, 374 Il. 545, 30 N.E.2d 36 (1940);
LaCueva Ranch Co. v. Brewer, 283 F.963 (7th Cir. 1922).
149 Madison v. Clark, 165 Il1. App. 228 (1911) ; Cravener v. Hale, 27
Ill. App. 275 (1888), afJ'd, 128 Ill. 408, 21 N.E. 534 (1889).
0 E.g., Voliva v. Cook, 262 Ill. 502, 104 N.E. 711 (1914).
'5' Springfield & N.E. Traction Co. v. Warrick, 249 Ill. 470, 94 N.E.
933 (1911) ; Shrontz v. Thyfault, 231 Ill. App. 228 (1924) ; Munnis v. Northern Hotel Co., 237 Ill. App. 50 (1925).
152E.g., Voliva v. Cook, 262 I1. 502, 104 N.E. 711 (1914).
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1. An instrument or document which is void on its face, or voidable because of fraud in its procurement.
2. Possibility of a claim on the instrument or document said to
be void or voidable, deception of some third party by the
instrument or document, and damage or injury in the event
some claim is founded on the instrument or document.
3. Absence of a remedy other than cancellation.
It is almost impossible to enumerate the kind of cases that
will qualify for the equitable relief of cancellation of instruments.
Generally, an instrument which is void may be set aside by cancellation. 15 3 Even where the ground for cancellation is established by extrinsic evidence, a court of equity will act to cancel
the instrument.
A common and frequent kind of case that requires this
form of equitable relief is cancellation of insurance policies
where, because of special circumstances, the remedy at law is
inadequate. In such cases, a court of equity will grant relief by
cancellation, even after occurrence of a loss under the policy.'
Where, for example, it has been agreed by the parties that
a lease should be surrendered and cancelled, but later demands
were made under the lease, a court of equity will order cancellation on the ground that by agreement, the lease had become
inoperative.155 Equity will cancel a document or instrument that
results from an oppressive or unconscionable bargain, particularly where the parties are not on equal terms." 6 Where a
mortgage or other instrument of indebtedness is recorded or
given for it, a
exists without any consideration having been
157
court of equity will order its cancellation.
Since a party who seeks equity must do equity, one who
sues to cancel an instrument must show that he can, has, or
has offered to restore the other party to the circumstances in
which the parties were before the instrument or document was
executed. A party seeking to cancel a document or instrument
must allege and prove that he has returned or offered to return
all benefits he received under the instrument." 8 Otherwise, he
will not be entitled to relief by cancellation of the instrument.
The party seeking equitable relief of cancellation must prove
that he is free from participation in any fraud that infected the
153 McIlvaine v. Foreman, 292 Ill. 224, 126 N.E. 749 (1920); Fraser v.
Glass, 311 Ill. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953 (1941); Field v. Herrick, 5 Ill. App.
54 (1880), aff'd, 101 Ill. 110 (1881).
154E.g., Jamerson v. Alliance Ins. Co., 87 F.2d 253 (7th Cir.), aff'd,
12 F. Supp. 957, cert. denied, 300 U.S. 683 (1937).
155E.g., Field v. Herrick, 5 Ill. App. 54 (1880), aff'd, 101 Ill. 110 (1881).
156 E.g., Munnis v. Northern Hotel C6., 237 Ill. App. 50 (1925).

15 E.g., Bishop v. Thompson, 196 Ill.'206, 63 N.E. 684 (1902).
158 Lees v. Akshun Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1953); Burnham v.

Kidwell, 113 Ill. 425 (1885).
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instrument.5

9

As in rescission of contracts, there must not be

160
laches or delay.

(e)

Reformation of Instruments
A written instrument that does not reflect the understanding
of the parties can be the subject of the equitable remedy known
as reformation of instruments. Before a case can qualify for this
equitable remedy, it must possess the following elements:
1. A written instrument concerning which reformation is the only
relief by which the desired result can be achieved.
2. Failure of the instrument to accord with the understanding of
the parties due to a mistake in expression, common to all parties to the agreement.

3. An agreement between the parties in effect when the instrument
was executed, a mutual mistake which makes the instrument
fail to carry out the agreement of the parties, and finally,
that*if reformed, the instrument will reflect the understanding
of the parties.
Often, reformation of instruments is confused with rescis-

sion. The essential feature of a reformed instrument is that as
changed, it conforms to the agreement of the parties. In the
nature of things, this result is not possible where no agreement
results because of fraud.
A court of equity will grant reformation of an instrument
when a mutual or common mistake infects the instrument. 161
The kinds of instrument that can be the subject of reformation
are numerous. Essentially, however, there must be proof that
the document does not reflect the understanding of the parties. 16 2
Insurance policies, deeds, contracts for the sale of real estate,
and contracts in general, may be the subject of reformation,
providing other elements are present.
-.I
. 1
It is ancient chancery law that while a written instrument
cannot be altered by parole proof, a court of equity will take
jurisdiction where there is a mutual mistake of fact in'the preparation of a paper that is to reflect an agreement. 6 3 A court of

equity has power to correct errors in a writing so as to make
I
it conform to what the parties intended.
When it is said that in order to reform an instrument there

must be proof of common or-mutual mistake; it is-meant that
there must be evidence of such mistake, not that .there is agreement between the parties that the mistake was common or
mutual.6 4 In other words, mutuality of mistake is to be. shown
E.g., Fitzgerald v. Forristal, 48 Ill. 228 (1868).
160 Shapiro v. Grosby, 25 Ill.2d 245, 184 N.E.2d 855 (1962); Cunningham
v. Fithian, 7 Ill. 650 (1845).
161 Gromer v. Molby, 385 Ill. 283, 52 N.E.2d 772 (1944); Biskupski v.
Jaroszewski, 398 Ill. 287, 76 N.E.2d 55 (1947).
162 E.g., Douglas v. Grant, 12 Ill. App. 273 (1882).
163 E.g., Silurian Oil Co. v. Neal 277 Ill. 45, 115 N.E. 114 (1917).
164 E.g., Matthews v. Whitethorn, 220 Ill. 36, 77 N.E. 89 (1906).
159
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by allegation and proof. The parties may disagree with regard
to what occurred. Yet, if the evidence discloses a mutuality
of mistake, a common error that precludes the instrument's
reflection of the true agreement of the parties, equity will reform.l5

In granting reformation, a court of equity will consider intervening rights of third parties. If there has been a delay in
seeking reformation, the right to reformation may be barred by
laches or by limitations.166 It has been held that a vendor of
land who after discovering a mistake in a deed delayed a year
before filing suit to reform, was not guilty of laches.'6 7 In instances in which land is involved and there is peaceable possession, a plaintiff has greater time latitude within which to
seek reformation.
In one case it was held that neither the statute of limitations nor the doctrine of laches is applicable where the plaintiff
has been in undisturbed possession of the land involved.1 6 On
the other hand, an owner of land misdescribed in a conveyance
by way of exchange was barred after waiting twenty years to
assert the right to reform.16 9 It was held that even though he
did not understand the English language, laches applied.1 7 0 The
lesson to be learned from these cases is that the suit to reform
should be filed promptly, and the right to reformation asserted
at the earliest opportunity.
The standard of proof required in a suit to reform an instrument is different from that required in other forms of
equitable relief. It is said generally that to justify a grant of
reformation, the plaintiff must establish his claim by evidence
that is clear and satisfactory.' 7 ' One case contains language that
to reform an instrument because of mistake, the ground must be
proved by satisfactory evidence beyond reasonable doubt. 7 2 In
another, the court held that the right to relief by reformation
of an instrument because of mistake must be established by
73
clear and convincing evidence.1
It should be noticed that the function of reformation is to
change the instrument so that it will speak as of the moment
165 E.g., Hamlon v. Sullivant, 11 Il. App. 423 (1882).
166 Calverly v. Harper, 40 Ill. App. 96 (1891) ; Lindsay v. Davenport, 18

Ill. 375 (1857).
167 Keeley v. Sayles, 217 Ill. 589, 75 N.E. 567 (1905) ; see also Schroeder
v. Smith, 249 Ill. 574, 94 N.E. 969 (1911).
168 E.g., Wykle v. Bartholomew, 258 Ill. 358, 101 N.E. 597 (1913).
169 E.g., Leuer v. Kunz, 260 Ill. 584, 103 N.E. 550 (1913).

1Id.
171 Buck v. Garber, 261

Ill. 378, 103 N.E. 1059 (1913); Oswald v.
Sproehnle, 16 Ill. App. 368 (1885); Douglas v. Grant, 12 Ill. App. 273

(1882).

1'2 E.g., Lines v. Willey, 253 Ill. 440, 97 N.E. 843 (1812).
173 Leuer v. Kunz, 274 Ill. 523, 113 N.E. 878 (1916); Wagner v. Milk

Wagon Drivers' Union, 320 Il1.

App. 341 (Abstract), 50 N.E.2d 865 (1943).
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of agreement. The document is made to reflect that which the
parties had in mind when they agreed. As a practical matter,
therefore, in the nature of the remedy, it is retroactive to the
time the parties had a meeting of the minds. While we do not
enumerate here all the consequences which may follow reformation of an instrument, it is necessary for the practitioner to be
aware of the nuances of the doctrine of reformation and the
equitable remedy available in this class of equity cases.
(f)

Account
Account is an equitable remedy granted (1) in aid of an
equitable right or (2) in aid of a legal right.
Before a case can qualify for the equitable relief of accounting, the following elements must be present:
1. A purely equitable right. For example, the right of a beneficiary to an accounting from his trustee or of a mortgagor
from a mortgagee who has entered into possession.
2. A right arising out of a legal relation, such as principal and
agent, mutual accounts or accounts from one side, where there
are special complications rendering account by an action at law
difficult.
3. A claim for an accounting incident to injunctive relief to
prevent the violation of a legal right.
As a form of equitable relief, the suit for an accounting has
historical vestigial remains from the days of comparable inadequacy of relief at law. Today in Illinois, a suit for an accounting presents problems which arise from the dual fact that:
(1) we no longer have masters in chancery and (2) discovery is
as extensive in actions at law as were available in court of
chancery at the height of its jurisdiction. The student of history
will remember that there was a time in England and in this
country when discovery procedures were not available in suits
at law. The combination of these two factors, elimination of
masters in chancery and full development of discovery in law
actions, now adversely affect the equitable relief of account.
Before the new judicial article took effect in 1964,'1 equity
courts exercised jurisdiction in account by assignments to masters in chancery. In fact, complication of accounts was a factor
that determined equity jurisdiction and made necessary the
utilization of masters who heard evidence, determined the account, and made a report to the court for entry of an appropriate decree. At law, the statute governing actions of account 75
provided for appointment of auditors to hear, adjust the claims,
and make reports which when approved by the court supported
entry of judgment. None of these aids are now available to an
Illinois judge sitting in chancery.
174 See text at note 12 supra.
175 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §341 (1963), rcpealed, January 1, 1964.
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Our judicial article prohibits the use of masters in chancery
or fee officers. 1' 6 Thus, in the very kind of case around which
courts of chancery developed the equitable relief of account, our
courts today cannot really grant this traditional form of remedy
without considerable inconvenience to lawyers and litigants.
. One practical solution to this problem is for the court to
induce the parties to enter into a consent decree directing an
account..- The second solution is for the court to determine,
initially, the duty to account. Then, after the account is filed,
with receipts accounted and explained, and disbursements supported by vouchers, the party entitled to the account can move
to strike items of the account to which he objects. The court
then can rule on the legal questions raised or hear evidence concerning sufficiency of the account thus stated. It can be easily
seen that this kind of procedure, in view of the fact that we no
longer have adequate means of granting the traditional equitable relief of account, is just as well available in a court sitting
at law as in a court sitting in chancery.
Often, the equity suit for account is to aid an equitable
right. For example, a beneficiary may sue to determine the
amount of trust assets and income. Where, on the other hand,
the amount claimed by the plaintiff is an exact sum and the
defendant admits that the plaintiff is entitled to that sum, there
is no ground for an accounting. 17 7 Where the sum due can be
ascertained only by inquiry into extensive books and records,
which because of their complexity jurors cannot satisfactorily
17 8
understand, a proper case for accounting in equity is made. '
The right to an accounting is not an absolute one. It is accorded only on equitable principles. Where the duty to account
flows from a fiduciary relation, no particular mode of account
is required except that the accounting must be made in a way
that will ascertain what property has come into the hands of
the fiduciary, what has passed out, what remains in his possession, including disclosure of all receipts and disbursements.'7
The right to an accounting in equity, and the way that right is
protected, depend on the nature of the case. No general rule
can be stated that will control all cases.
When an action for account is filed, there must first be a
determination of the plaintiff's right to this form of equitable
art. VI, §8.
v. Hornbeek, 5 Il.App. 2d 253, 125 N.E.2d 535 (1955);
App. 103 (1925); McCormick v.
Manhattan State Bank v. Moritz, 238 Ill.
Page, 96 I1. App. 447 (1901). 'See also Central Iron & Metal Co. v. Krug,
189 Ill. App. 44 (1914).
178 People v. Small, 319 Ill. 437, 150 N.E. 435 (1925) ; Boock v. Napier,
3 Ill.-App.-2d 19, 120 N.E.2d 244 (1954); Midland Underwriters, Inc. v.
Travelers Cas. Ins. Co., 308 Ill. App. 239, 31 N.E.2d 614 (1941).
17 E.g., Reid v. Silver, 354 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1965).
176 ILL. CONST.

177Hornbeek
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relief. This right need not be determined in a hearing separate
from that in which the amount due is decided. Thus, if the
chancery judge hears evidence on the right to an accounting at
the time he determines the amount due, entry of a decree is not
abuse of discretion.1 0 Again, like all equitable remedies, grant
of ultimate relief by decree to account rests in the sound dis18
cretion of the chancellor. '
(g)

Receivers and Receiverships
A receivership is a remedy ancillary to the principal object
of an equity suit. Receiverships are of three kinds: (1.) Those
governed by a statute. For example, the Commissioner of Savings and Loan Associations under the Savings and Loan Act has
power to appoint a receiver after taking custody of an association for involuntary liquidation.8 2 Under the Illinois Development Credit Corporation Act 83 the director of financial institutions has the power to appoint a receiver to take custody of
any Development Credit Corporation which is suspended under
the provisions of Chapter 32, Sec. 1028 (1) (a)- (i).114 (2.) Those
appointed out of court pursuant to a mortgage, debenture, trust
deed or other contractual undertaking. For example, in most
mortgages and trust deeds there are provisions that on default
the mortgagee can appoint a receiver to take possession of the
mortgaged property. 85 In business financing by debentures, it
is common for debenture holders, or someone for them, to have
power to appoint a receiver of the company on default of payment or a covenant.'86 (3.) Those appointed by the court. It
is with this latter category of receiverships that we are concerned.
Before a court of equity will appoint a receiver, the following elements must be present:
1. Need of a receiver to prevent fraud.
2. Need of a receiver to save the subject of litigation from material injury.
3. Need of a receiver to rescue the subject of litigation from
probable destruction pending suit.
A receivership is a high and extraordinary remedy which a
180 Rohde v. Mayer, 90 Ill. App. 2d 270, 232 N.E.2d 519 (1967) ; Derhers
v. Vaughan Co., 348 Il. App. 407, 109 N.E.2d 262 (1952).
181Freeman v. Freyer, 30 Ill. App. 2d 185, 174 N.E.2d 217 (1961);
Forster, Waterbury & Co. v. Webster Mfg. Co., 108 Ill. App. 41 (1902).
182 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, §921 (1967).
182 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§1001-28 (1967).
184 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §1028(1) (a)-(1)

(1967).
185 Keller v. Rodie, 326 Il1. App. 37, 61 N.E.2d 387 (1945); Wright v.
Matters, 204 Ill. App. 398 (1917); Stevens v. Pearson, 202 Ill. App. 22
(1916).
186 2 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS, §798 (1953).
SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF
EQUITY 604 (25th ed. R. Megarry & P. Baker 1960).
See Re B. Johnson &
Co., Ltd. (1955) ch. 634, 661, 664.
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court of equity will grant only on showing that the plaintiff
has a clear right to the property.1 7 A receiver is a fiduciary of
the court. Possession by the receiver is possession in the court.' 8
Title or right to the property in receivership is not changed by
grant of the relief. Undisturbed possession by a receiver is a
high prerogative of a court of equity. A receiver's possession
cannot be disturbed, even by judicial process. 89
There is a tendency on the part of practitioners to believe
that any dispute concerning property will justify appointment of
a receiver. This is a misapprehension, both as to the nature of a
receivership and of its extraordinary character as an equitable
remedy. The main purpose of a receivership is to preserve the
property in dispute. 190 Receivership, as a remedy, is always ancillary to the relief sought in the case. It is generally said that
the appointment of a receiver must be in aid of a primary
object of the suit, germane to the principal case, but never the
sole aim of the litigation.' 9'
Where a receivership is sought, it is useful to determine
whether plaintiff's right in the property subject of litigation is
legal or equitable. If the right is equitable, a case can be made
in which a court of equity will exercise its discretionary power
and appoint a receiver. Equity will preserve equitable rights
by exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. On the other hand,
if the interest of the plaintiff in the property is legal, it may be
necessary to resolve questions concerning the legal right before
equity will grant equitable relief of a receivership. It is in
making this distinction that practitioners have the most difficulty; and it is in this area that most mistakes are made concerning applications for receiverships. In other words, it is a
common failing for lawyers to overlook the distinction between
a legal right in property and one that is equitable.
For example, the beneficiary of a trust seeking its enforcement, alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duties by the trustee, shows an interest in the trust res that is equitable. Shareholders of a corporation, on the other hand, who allege breach
of the fiduciary duty owed them by directors and officers
of the corporation, show an interest that is legal, even though
the duty owed is equitable. A minor, whose property is in the
custody of a guardian, who alleges dissipation of his estate,
87

E.g., Simpson v. Adkins, 311 Ill. App. 543, 37 N.E.2d 355 (1941).
v. Macek, 350 111. 135, 182 N.E. 745 (1932) ; People v.
Furey, 306 Ill. App. 607, 29 N.E.2d 612 (1940).
189 Kneisel v. Ursus Motor Co., 316 Ill. 336, 147 N.E. 243 (1925), aff'g,
234 I1. App. 371 (1924) ; Gunning v. Sorg, 113 Ill. App. 332 (1904), aff'd,
214 Il. 616, 73 N.E. 870 (1905).
190 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Arnold, 268 Il1. App. 450 (1932)
Chicago Trust Co. v. Supreme Liberty Life Ins. Co., 261 Ill. App. 551 (1931).
19' E.g., Davis v. Alton, J. & P. Ry., 180 Ill. App. 1 (1913).
1

188 Anderson
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shows an equitable interest in the property controlled by the
guardian.
A receiver is not an agent of any party to the litigation.19
He has the right to be paid his fees, expenses, and costs, from
the assets of the receivership estate. His fees are determined
by the court in accordance with standards of compensation that
are fair, just, and reasonable. 193 A receiver performs a useful
public function in retaining custody and preserving the property
subject of litigation. As a consequence, he is entitled to just
compensation. In England, under the Law of Property Act,
a receiver has the right to be paid the costs, charges, and expenses incurred as receiver by a commission not exceeding 5%
of the gross amount of all money received. 9 4 In most American
jurisdictions, including Illinois, there is a comparable standard
used in determining what is just compensation for a receiver.
What is the procedure for the appointment of a receiver?
A receiver is appointed by a petition which specifically
alleges reasons for the receivership. 1 9 5 Mere legal conclusions
of the pleader will not suffice. Therefore, an oral application
for the appointment of a receiver should never be made. The
petition must be clear and complete in its allegations. It should
be with notice, supported by affidavit, and opposing parties should
be allowed a reasonable time to answer, followed by a hearing. 96
Appointment of a receiver is a remedy that results in taking
property out of one party's possession and placing it in the custody of the court. 97 Because of this, the law imposes requirements, conformable to equitable considerations, as conditions
precedent before a receiver is appointed. Generally, a receiver
is not appointed before it is time to answer the complaint,
unless it is alleged in the complaint and supported by petition
that fraud or some other strong ground exists to induce the
court to act before the defendant pleads." 8 All parties in interest are entitled to notice and they should be before the court
when the petition for appointment is filed.
A petition for the appointment of a receiver which alleges
facts on information and belief is inadequate to support an
order of appointment. 19' Where a complaint is denied by an
192 E.g., Redington v. Craig, 270 Ill. App. 163 (1933).
193 E.g., Robinson v. Ruprecht, 147 Ill. App. 646 (1909).
194 Law of Property Act, 1925, §109 (6).
195 E.g., Cohen v. Financial Acceptance Co., 56 I1. App. 2d 359, 206
N.E.2d 308 (1965).
196 Simpson v. Adkins, 311 11. App. 543, 37 N.E.2d 35 (1941); Fox v.
Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 349 IIl. App. 132, 110 N.E.2d 84 (1953).
197 Seegren v. Decker, 263 Ill. App. 373 (1931); Bright v. Riedy, 243
Ill. App. 314 (1927).
198 Nartznik v. Ehman, 191 I1. App. 71 (1916); Daley v. Nelson, 119
627 (1905).
Ill. App.
199 E.g., Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 349 Ill. App. 132, 110
N.E.2d 84 (1953).

262

The John MarshallJournalof Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 2:230

answer, a court cannot construe the allegations of the complaint
as true and appoint a receiver.2 0 0 As a general rule, courts of
equity do not appoint receivers ex parte. 20 1 However, if a receiver is appointed without notice and the defendant moves
and obtains a hearing on his motion to discharge, absence of
20 2
notice is waived.
Although one can find in the cases language and holdings
to the contrary, it is generally said that the power to appoint a
receiver is possessed by a court of equity as part of its general
preventive jurisdiction, to be applied and exercised whenever
necessary to prevent injury and do complete justice. 20 3 Under
204
provisions of section 54 of the Chancery Act
Before any receiver shall be appointed the party making the
application shall give bond to the adverse party in such penalty
as the court or judge may order and with security to be approved
by the court or judge conditioned to pay all damages including
reasonable attorneys' fees sustained by reason of the appointment
and acts of such receiver, in case the appointment of such receiver
is revoked or set aside; provided, that bond need not be required,
when for a good cause shown, and upon notice and full hearing,
the court is of opinion that a receiver ought to be appointed without such bond.
Consistent with this statute, it has been held that equity courts
in this state are without power to waive the complainant's bond
without the grounds for such waiver being given in the order
of appointment.20 5 It has been held that an order appointing
a receiver which does not comply with these requirements is in--.
20 6
adequate.
In addition to the complainant's bond, the receiver
must also give bond for faithful performance of his office as a
receiver. The amount and condition of the bond shall be set
207
by the court, depending on the facts of the given case.
It is easy to observe an incongruity in these provisions: an
Illinois circuit court sitting in equity cannot issue a temporary
20 8
restraining order or a temporary injunction without bond.
Yet, when the harsher remedy of a receivership is granted, bond
can be waived.
The order appointing a receiver should make necessary findings of fact and reach the requisite conclusions of law. It is true
200 E.g., Klass v. Yavitch, 302 Ill. App. 229, 23 N.E.2d 936 (1939).
201 E.g., Gilbert v. Block, 51 Ill. App. 516 (1893).
202E.g., Hancock v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 86 Ill. App. 630
(1900).
203 E.g., Simpson v. Adkins, 311 Ill.
App. 543, 37 N.E.2d 355 (1941).
204 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 22, §54 (1967).
205 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Bickley, 255 Ill.
App. 45 (1929) ; Ayres
v. Graham Steamship C. & L. Co., 150 Ill. App. 137 (1909).
206 E.g., John Spry Lumber Co. v. Hardin, 172 Ill. App. 86 (1912).
207E.g., Anderson v.. Hultberg, 117 Ill. App. 231 (1904), aff'd, 252 Ill.
607, 97 N.E. 216 (1912).
208 Gunnels v. Industrial Comm'n, 30 Ill.2d 181, 195 N.E.2d 609 (1964);
Wise v. City of Chicago, 36 Il. App. 2d 196, 183 N.E.2d 538 (1962).
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that absence of findings and conclusions will not result in a void
order.2 0 9 However, high professional craftmanship dictates that

the receivership order be complete in its findings, giving the
reasons for the appointment as clearly as they can be stated
under the circumstances.
There are occasions when an application for receivership
cannot strictly conform with all the procedural requirements:
notice, petition and bond. Even in such cases, the practitioner
should attempt to minimize the risk that occurs with the absence of notice, and opportunity for the opposing side to be heard.
When a true emergency exists, appearance in court with a
clearly drafted petition supported by affidavit, witnesses, and a
court reporter to preserve the record, will aid in upholding the
court's order if emergency appointment of a receiver is ordered.
Even in such circumstances, the practitioner should always bear
in mind that appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary
remedy and that it is the chancellor's duty to search the record
to determine sufficient foundation for such action. The requirement of a complainant's bond exposes the applicant for
receivership to damages in the event injury results to the
opposing party by the receivership appointment. It is this possible consequence to his client that the practitioner should bear
in mind when a hasty or ill-advised application for the appointment of a receiver is made.
(h) Enforcement of Trusts
A distinguished student of English equity once said that
"No one has yet succeeded in giving an entirely satisfactory definition of a trust. ' 210

This statement is true because a trust is a

conglomerate concept. It possesses many of the characteristics
of other legal phenomena. Trusts are of many kinds and as a
generic subject, it has been treated to many classifications.
Hanbury, in his authoritative work, Modern Equity,211 has sug-

gested that trusts be divided into express and constructive, private and charitable, executed and executory. Understandably,
it is impossible within the space limitations of this paper to
treat a subject as broad as trusts to such an exhaustive analysis.
What will be attempted is a discussion of the three trusts' divisions which are useful for the practitioner.
(i) Express Trusts
An express trust is an intentional arrangement of property
so that legal title is in one person and the right to beneficial
209 Graffeo v. O'Brien, 333 Ill.
App. 332, 77 N.E.2d 350 (1948) (Abstract) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §64(3) (1967).
210 SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 83 (25th ed. R. Megarry & P. Baker
1960).
211 H. HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY 99 (7th ed. 1957).
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enjoyment, enforceable solely in equity, is in another.2 12 Enforcement of trusts is one of the oldest heads of chancery jurisdiction.2 13 To qualify for the equitable relief of enforcement, a
case in which it is claimed an express trust exists must contain
the following elements:
1. Certainty of intent by a person competent to create a trust.
2. Certainty as to the subject matter of the trust property and the
object of the trust.
3. Certainty as to designated beneficiaries who can enforce the
trust.
An express trust in which land is the corpus must be in
writing. 14 On the other hand, an express trust in which the
corpus is personal property can be created by parol. A court
of equity can establish and enforce a voluntary oral trust con2 15
cerning personal property.
The person who creates the trust is known as the settlor.
The person to whom the property is conveyed or transferred is
the trustee. The subject matter or corpus of the trust is called
the res. Those who are to benefit from the trust are beneficiaries. An express trust can be created either during the life
of the settlor, in which case it is said to be inter vivos; or, it
can be created by a will, in which case it is said to be testamentary.
In the old days of chancery practice, a trust was enforced,
as were most equitable rights, by a bill in equity. 216 In Illinois,
since adoption of the Civil Practice Act, the procedure for
enforcement of a trust is by complaint with the pleading of the
defendant being an answer. All other procedural steps in an
equity suit today are governed by the rules of civil practice.
Although there is extensive literature on the subject of equity
procedure, the practitioner is well advised to follow the modern
which apply equally to equity
texts of pleading and practice
217
suits and to actions at law.
As a general rule, persons who have an interest in the trust,
whether vested, contingent or future, have the right to enforce
it. Thus, children of a named remainderman can sue, even
before death of the life tenant, to seek relief against a trustee
who appropriated real estate from the trust. 21 In this connection, the fact that a member of a class of beneficiaries who sues
OF TRUSTS §2 (1959).
(SECOND)
E.g., Hopkins v. Granger, 52 Ill. 504 (1869).
214E.g., Horne v. Ingraham, 125 Ill. 198, 16 N.E. 868 (1888).
215 People v. Schaefer, 266 Ill. 334, 107 N.E.. 617 (1914) ; Alexander v.
Mermel, 27 Ill. App. 2d 281, 169 N.E.2d 569 (1960).
212RESTATEMENT
213

216 S. PUTERBAUGH,

PUTERBAUGH'S

CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE

523-40 (6th ed. 1916).
217 See generally C. NICHOLS, NICHOLS ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE (revised
1960-63); CALLAHAN'S ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE FORMS (H. Clark et al.
1954).
App. 563, 19 N.E.2d 382 (1939).
218 E.g., Burns v. Hines, 298 Ill.
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may take nothing from the trust does not disqualify him from
bringing action to redress injury to the trust. 1 "
A court of equity has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the rights, duties, and obligations in an express trust.2 2 0 Even
though the ultimate relief may be the recovery of money, equity
may exercise jurisdiction and grant relief. 22 1 This doctrine extends to actions by a beneficiary against a trustee for negligence
in the administration of the trust estate.122 The fact that the
complainant, a beneficiary, has a legal remedy does not oust a
court of equity from its power to grant relief.
The kind of relief which a court of equity will grant in
enforcing a trust depends on the facts, there being no general
rule controlling all cases. In the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over trusts and trustees, a court of equity has broad
22
powers to fashion the remedy as the circumstances require.
A trustee will not be allowed to profit from his trust. Yet,
even where he is ordered to reconvey property he acquired ex
maleficio, a court of equity will decree that reconveyance be
subject to reimbursement for the amount the trustee spent in
acquiring the property involved. 224 In other words, contrary
to a common view, equity will not decree forfeiture of money
or property on finding that the trustee wrongfully dealt with the
trust res. Where a court of equity assumes jurisdiction over a
trust, its trustees and its beneficiaries, it will retain it for the
purpose entering any order justice may require. 225 The final
decree, of course, is appealable. However, it must be a final decree before the right of review accrues.
(ii) Implied or Resulting Trusts
A resulting trust is a presumption from the acts of the
parties. It arises by operation of law. Before there can be a
resulting trust, the following elements must be present:
1. An express trust, accompanied by a failure to exhaust all
beneficial interests.
2. Purchase of property in the name of one, when the consideration, in whole or in part, is furnished by another.
3. An express trust created for a consideration, followed by a
total failure of that consideration.
4. An express trust for a purpose that is unlawful; but the unlawful purpose is only contemplated and not consummated.
A resulting trust is implied from the facts and circumE.g., Edgerton v. Johnson, 178 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1949).
E.g., Dowland v. Staley, 201 Ill. App. 6 (1914) (Abstract).
221 E.g., Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461 (1901).
222E.g., Hukill v. Page, 12 F. Cas. 850 (No. 6854) (C.C.N.D. I1. 1874).
223 E.g., Coates v. Woodworth, 13 Ill. 654 (1852).
224 Mruk v. Mruk, 379 Ill. 394, 41 N.E.2d 490 (1942); Walden v. Gridley, 36 Ill. 523 (1864) ; Tegtmeyer v. Tegtmeyer, 314 Ill. App. 16, 40 N.E.2d
767 (1942).
225 E.g., Ohlheiser v. Shepherd, 84 111. App. 2d 83, 228 N.E.2d 210 (1967).
219
220

266
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The law pre-

sumes an intent to create a trust where the conduct of the parties
supports such a presumption.
Where, for example, a plaintiff alleges that he conveyed
property to his father with the understanding that the father
retain it for support and reconvey it by deed or will, there is7
22
an express trust and the law will not presume a resulting one.
On the other hand, where a deceased kin of the plaintiffs furnished all the consideration for purchase of land, and the defendant took title in joint tenancy with the deceased, a resulting
trust was found on the intent presumed from the conduct of
the parties. The trust arose the instant legal title was taken."
The most common situation in which resulting trusts arise
is that in which one party furnishes the consideration, in whole
or in part, and the title to the property is taken by one who is
either a stranger or, if a kin or close relative, was not intended
to be the sole owner. Where title is taken by a kin or close
relative, there is a prima facie presumption that the money for
the purchase price was an advancement or gift. 229

This pre-

sumption is rebuttable, the burden of proof being initially on
the party claiming the resulting trust.
The nature of the property is not important in determining
whether a resulting trust will arise. If the property is land, the
Statute of Frauds does not apply. Resulting trusts and con2
structive trusts are outside the Statue of Frauds.

0

3

A resulting trust arises, if at all, at the moment the legal
estate is acquired and the title vests. 2

1

Inquiry into the facts

and circumstances giving rise to the claim of a resulting trust
must be addressed to the moment the legal interest in the property
was acquired by the person against whom the resulting trust is
claimed. If the evidence discloses that at that moment of time
the intention of the parties was that no trust result, the resulting
trust may be defeated.223

In the final analysis, the surrounding

circumstances and the conduct of the parties control. Where,
for example, a transaction is of such a kind that it is equitable
that a resulting trust arise, even an agreement to the contrary
2 33
will not prevent this result.

A resulting trust can never arise where a grantor exe226 Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N.E. 498 (1911) ; Suwalski v. Suwalski,
88 Ill. App. 2d 419, 232 N.E.2d 64 (1967).
227 E.g., Monson v. Hutchin, 194 Ill. 431, 62 N.E. 788 (1902).
228 E.g., Kane v. Johnson, 397 Ill. 112, 73 N.E.2d 321 (1947).,
229 E.g., Wright v. Wright, 242 Ill. 71, 89 N.E. 789 (1909).
230 E.g., Murray v. Behrendt, 399 Ill. 22, 76 N.E.2d 431 (1947).
231 E.g., Suwalski v. Suwalski, 88 Ill. App. 2d 419, 232 N.E.2d 64 (1967).
232 E.g., Frewin v. Stark, 319 Ill. 35, 149 N.E. 588 (1925).
.233 E.g., Kochorimbus v. Maggos, 323 Ill. 510, 154 N.E. 235 (1926).
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cuted an absolute deed.2 3 4 Implicit in a transaction of this kind

is the intent that title vest in the grantee. On the other hand,
where a grantor conveys property as consideration for title to
other property, the conveyance is no different than payment of
purchase money. Where this is shown, one important element
for a resulting trust is present.
Where identical property is already subject to an express
trust, a resulting trust cannot be imposed on

it.3

It is common

equity law, however, that where an express trust is created, but
there is a failure to dispose of all beneficial interests, a resulting trust arises for benefit of the settlor, to the extent that
beneficial interests remain undisposed231

For example, where a settlor set aside property for the
purpose of creating an express trust but died before completion
of the settlement, to the extent that title was acquired by the
intended trustee, a resulting trust arose in favor of the settlor's
heirs and devisees. 237

In fact, whenever an express trust fails, a

resulting trust arises in favor of the settlor, his heirs and
devisees. More complicated questions can arise if an express
trust fails and there are creditors or other claimants.
For the imaginative lawyer, the resulting trust concept is a
useful device. It can be used to resolve many complex difficulties into which laymen fall in dealing with property. When
understood, these doctrines are easy to apply. They begin with
the notion that a resulting trust is a presumption the law raises
from the conduct of the parties. When a settlor creates a trust,
but all beneficial interests are not disposed, the law presumes
an intention to settle the remainder. So too, where a trust is
created for a contemplated but unconsummated unlawful purpose, a resulting trust arises in favor of the settlor. Where one
furnishes consideration and title to the property is taken in another, the law presumes an intention to create a trust, said to
be resulting. These examples do not exhaust the full potential
of this concept. As a form of equitable relief, its use depends on
the adeptness with which it is understood, and in its application
from case to case.
(iii) -Constructiv4e Trusts
A constructive trust is a device administered in courts 23of8
equity to remedy-frauds and breaches of fiduciary relations.
234 E.g., Lancaster v. Springer, 239 Ill. 472, 88 N.E. 272- (1909).
E.g., Baker v. LeMire, 355 Ill. 626, 189 N.E. 904 (1934).
236 E.g. Zimmerman v. Schuster, 14 Ill. App. 2d 535, 145 N.E.2d 94
(1957).
235

237

Wagner v. Clauson, 399 Ill. 403, 78 N.E.2d 203 (1948) ; Jones v.

McCollen, 85 Il. App. 2d 375, 227 N.E.2d 788 (1967).
238E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Dierking, 87 Ill. App. 2d 4, 230 N.E.2d
520 (1967).
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Whenever one held in confidence takes advantage of his position
or whenever a person commits a fraud, equity will impose a
constructive trust on the product and compel its return as justice
may require. 239 Before a court of equity will impose a constructive trust, the following elements must be present:
1. Actual fraud or circumstances which stamp the conduct of the
person unfair or wrongful.
2. A confidential relationship and a subsequent abuse of confidence.
3. A res - that is money, property or other subject matter on
which a constructive trust can be imposed.
Even more than the resulting trust, the constructive trust is
an effective means of undoing injustice. In determining whether
there are facts raising a constructive trust, the moment of inquiry is the time when the res was acquired by the alleged
wrongdoer. 24
At that moment if there was fraud or such
conduct which in equity and good conscience stamps the wrongdoer as unfair, equity will compel him to return what he obtained.
241
The constructive trust is sometimes called a trust ex maleficio.
The other inquiry, absent actual fraud, unfair or wrongful conduct, is whether at the time there was a relationship of trust
and confidence.2 42 Here, the possibilities are numerous.
An agent is in a fiduciary relation with his principal.2 4 3 A
joint venturor owes a duty of trust and confidence to his fellow
joint venturor. 2 4
An employee, in most instances, is in a
fiduciary relation with his employer. 245
A husband owes a duty
of trust to his wife with regard to family property. 26 A son or
daughter may be in a fiduciary relation with a parent who is
unable to care for his or her affairs.247 Other relations can be
found out of which flow trust and confidence, and are thus
fiduciary in nature. In any of these, breach of the fiduciary
relation will give rise to the trust ex maleficio to be imposed
on the thing gained.
The constructive trust is created by implication and may be
proved by parol evidence.2 48 Like resulting trusts, constructive
trusts are not within the Statute of Frauds.2 4 9 Once actual fraud,
wrongful, unfair, or unconscionable conduct is shown, or when
239 E.g., Mortell v. Beckman, 16 Ill.2d 209, 157 N.E.2d 63 (1959).
240 E.g., Streeter v. Gamble, 298 Ill. 332, 131 N.E. 589 (1921).
241 E.g., Ryder v. Ryder, 244 Ill. 297, 91 N.E. 451 (1910).
242 Stephenson v. Kulichek, 410 Ill. 139, 101 N.E.2d 542 (1951); Fowley
v. Braden, 4 IlI.2d 355, 122 N.E.2d 559 (1954).
242 E.g., Bremer v. Bremer, 411 Ill. 154, 104 N.E.2d 299 (1952).
244E.g., Spencer v. Wilsey, 330 Ill. App. 439, 71 N.E.2d 804 (1947).
245 E.g., Tinkoff v. Wyland, 272 Ill. App. 280 (1933).
246 E.g., Maurica v. Haugen, 387 I1. 186, 56 N.E.2d 367 (1944).
24? E.g., Oster v. Oster, 414 11. 470, 111 N.E.2d 319 (1953).
248 Wrlla v. Wrlla, 342 Ill. 31, 173 N.E. 768 (1930); Rice v. Dougherty,
148 Ill. App. 368 (1909).
249 E.g., Murray v. Behrendt, 399 Ill. 22, 76 N.E.2d 431 (1948).
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a fiduciary relation is established, the bases for a constructive
trust are established.
However, there are limitations to the application of the
concept. Breach of an express trust, or of a written contract,
will not give rise to a constructive trust.2 50 Where no charge
of fraud or overreaching is made and there is no evidence of
either, and, additionally, there is no evidence of a fiduciary
relation and its breach, there is no basis for a constructive
trust. 51
In every case where a constructive trust is sought, there
must be a corpus: that is some money, property or subject
matter of value acquired from the fraud or the breach of
fiduciary relation. It is characteristic of all trusts, constructive
or otherwise, that there be a res3 51 In other words, a constructive trust in the abstract does not meet fundamental principles
of trust law.
What is fraud?
structive trust?

That is, fraud forming the basis of a con-

Fraud is either actual or constructive 35
Actual fraud,
which courts of equity remedy concurrent with courts of law,
is a false statement of a material fact knowingly made or without
belief in its truth, or made recklessly without caring whether
it is true or false, with the intent that it be acted on and which
is acted on to the injury of a party.2 4 In actual fraud there must
be proof of intent to defraud. 2 51 Whether there is intent will
depend on the facts and circumstances.
Constructive fraud, on the other hand, is an act which the
law will presume fraudulent even though there is no evidence
of actual fraud.2 56 Constructive fraud is committed when the
wrongdoing party is under a legal or equitable duty to act
otherwise. As a general statement, it is said that constructive
fraud is.a breach of duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the
law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, to
violate confidence, and to injure public interest.2 57 It can be
easily seen that these are broad concepts having broad applicaE.g., Swanson v. Randall, 30 Ill.2d 194, 195 N.E.2d 656 (1964).
E.g., Fender v. Yagemann, 29 IlI.2d 205, 193 N.E.2d 794 (1963).
252 E.g., Williams v. Rock River Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Ill. App. 2d 5,
200 N.E.2d 848 (1964).
253 Miller v. Miller, 266 Ill. 522, 107 N.E. 821 (1915) ; Kochorimbus v.
Maggos, 323 Ill. 510, 154 N.E. 235 (1926) ; Stein v. Stein, 398 Ill. 397, 75
N.E.2d 869 (1947).
254 McMeen v. Whipple, 23 Ill.2d 352, 178 N.E.2d 351 (1961) ; Broberg v.
Mann, 66 Ill. App. 2d 134, 234 N.E.2d 89 (1965).
255 Dahlke v. Hawthorn,
Lane & Co., 36 Ill.2d 241, 222 N.E.2d 465
(1966) ; Miller v. Howell, 2 Ill. 498 (1838).
256 E.g., Blake v. Thwing, 185 Ill. App. 187 (1914).
25 7
E.g., Edward Edinger Co. v. Willis, 260 Ill. App. 106, 131 (1931).
250

251

270
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tions. As is the case with most legal concepts, they are easier
to define than to apply.
The task of determining whether a case is one in which a
constructive trust can arise, first devolves on the practitioner.
The ultimate responsibility, of course, is on the court of equity
to which application is made for this important branch of
equitable relief.
III

A SUMMARY
Every equity case requires a practitioner to determine
initially whether it will qualify for equitable relief. In making
this determination, use must be made of those doctrines which
originated in English equity and developed in this country until
the complete amalgamation of equity and law. In Illinois, .the
amendment to the Judicial Article which took effect in 1964
abolished jurisdictional distinctions between courts of equity and
courts of law. Today, circuit courts of this state have unlimited
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters with power to grant any
form of relief which the case requires.
For the practitioner this is important because it is no longer
necessary to resort to chancery or a division for equitable relief.
Any judge, and this includes magistrates and associate judges
of our circuit courts, can grant equitable relief. There was a
time in Illinois when this was not possible.
Despite this modern development, it is necessary that statutory .and traditional forms of equitable relief be understood.
Having in mind the changes taking place in our society as a
whole, no practitioner should hesitate to suggest to a judge of
a circuit court in Illinois relief which may combine traditional
equity concepts, providing only there is a justiciable matter
before the court. It is in this spirit that the history of equity
should be looked to in formulating modern remedies. And it is
i.n this spirit that traditional concepts of equity should be applied
in determining whether a case which a practitioner is called
upon to handle-qualifies for equitable relief.

